Turkmen, Chinese Officials Offer Conflicting Figures On Gas Shipments; Regional Trade, Energy Projects Under Scrutiny

China’s state-run international channel aired an on-camera conversation March 24 with Turkmenistan’s leader that painted warm ties between the two capitals, but numbers offered during that exchange did not match figures given by Chinese diplomats days later. In Beijing, Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov said Turkmenistan has been sending about 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas a year to China and that both sides aim to lift deliveries to 65 bcm. Yet on March 27, China’s ambassador in Ashgabat, Ji Shumin, said Turkmen exports to China totaled roughly 30 bcm last year and are expected to remain near that level for 2026, noting that reaching 65 bcm would hinge on completion of a planned new pipeline known as Line D — a project he described as still under consideration. Energy analysts say the mismatch highlights the difficulty of planning for downstream utilities and traders when official tallies diverge.

The Line D initiative dates back more than a decade, beginning in 2014, but progress has been intermittent and the effort stalled amid disagreements over pricing and other commercial terms. The three operational routes from Turkmenistan to China — sometimes labeled A, B and C — have a combined throughput of about 55 bcm annually, yet current flows amount to a little more than one-half of that capacity. “When planned capacity and actual deliveries differ this markedly, it raises risks for supply contracts and for countries that depend on predictable flows,” said Maria Ivanova, a Central Asia energy specialist at a regional policy institute. She added that unresolved commercial disputes and unclear pipeline timetables make investor confidence fragile.

Beyond hydrocarbons, Berdymukhamedov told the broadcaster that more than 10,000 Turkmen nationals are studying in China, which, if verified, would make the PRC the second-most common destination for Turkmen students after Russia. By comparison, Turkmen enrollment in U.S. institutions remains in the low double digits. Such education ties are also part of broader trade and people-to-people exchanges that officials from both sides repeatedly cite when discussing the relationship.

In neighboring Kazakhstan, Chinese investment and trade continued to surface in several sectors. Jiaxin International Resources Investment Ltd., a Chinese firm developing the Boguty tungsten deposit, reported about $136 million in revenue and roughly $42 million in profit for 2025 after losing $22.5 million the year before. Its $300 million ore-processing plant began commercial operations in April 2025 and produced just over 5,000 metric tons of tungsten concentrate by year’s end; at full output the facility is expected to generate around 10,000 tons annually for several decades. All of the 2025 output was reportedly shipped to China, reinforcing Beijing’s access to a strategic raw material. Separately, PetroKazakhstan Kumkol Resources — a joint venture between CNPC and Kazakhstan’s KazMunayGas — will distribute $50 million in dividends for the first quarter of 2025, with two-thirds earmarked for CNPC. Kazakhstan and China are also preparing an intergovernmental accord to raise the annual volume of Russian crude transiting Kazakh territory from 10 million to 12.5 million tons, officials said.

Kazakh exporters are meanwhile warning of new hurdles to agricultural shipments after Beijing introduced revised rules for animal feed ingredient makers that could exclude some suppliers or cause delays and penalties. Producers are lobbying Nur-Sultan for diplomatic help. Domestic customs software problems — centered on the Keden platform — have also been cited by businesses as a source of holdups that inflate export costs, according to local reporting. On a softer note, a China-Kazakhstan music television show produced with Hunan Broadcasting and Chinese state media recently premiered in Kazakhstan, featuring young performers from Central Asia and several European and Asian countries.

Bishkek continues to press Beijing for improved access to China’s food market, with modest advances so far: Kyrgyz exporters dispatched an initial 25-ton consignment of corn to China and have won registration that will allow shipments of frozen fruit via China’s CIFER customs system. Kyrgyz officials also sought Chinese assistance to modernize emergency services equipment; Beijing has provided some firefighting gear and mobile medical units, though the ambassador in Bishkek offered no firm commitments on broader projects.

In Uzbekistan, tourist flows from China are climbing sharply — about 49,000 Chinese visitors arrived in the first two months of 2026, more than three times the year-earlier tally — even as China still represents a small share of the overall influx. Uzbek authorities reported roughly 1.8 million foreign arrivals in January and February combined. E-commerce tensions persist: Temu, the U.S.-rooted online marketplace, has been trying to re-enter the Uzbek market since restrictions were imposed in March 2025 over tax and consumer-protection concerns. Six delegations from the company have held talks with regulators in the past year, but discussions have yet to resolve the outstanding regulatory issues.